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PAROL TESTIMONY IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF
WILLS.
I iAuv perused with some care and much interest the report of
the case of Kurtz v. Bfibner et al., ante, p. 93, and the editorial
note appended, in which the learned editor feels compelled to
dissent from the conclusions of the court, as announced in the
opinion of Mr. Justice THORNTON. The principle involved is of
the highest importance, and is worthy of the most careful consideration of the profession.
From the best consideration which I have been able to give
the subject, I am constrained to the conclusion that the decision
of the court is right, and that the editor has fallen into an error.
The great learning and deservedly high reputation of the editor
who wrote that note, and the profound respect I have ever entertained for him as. an eminent jurist, whose labors have done so
much to advaice the science of the law, have caused me to hesitate
long before allowing myself to disagree with him.
The fundamental error of the editor, in my apprehension,
consists in his assuming that necessarily the testator designed to
devise land to which he ad a present existing title. To maintain this assumption we must find that the court, as a matter of
law, must declare that it was impossible for the testator to intend
to devise property to which he had not a present title, when
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there is no expression in the will intimating such a purpose. I
have met with no case, and certainly none has been cited in the
editorial note, in which such a doctrine is intimated.
While in the particular case we may admit that this is most
probably true, we must also admit that it is not necessarily so,
and the court had no warrant for saying, as matter of law, or as
a necessary legal conclusion, that such was the case; and hence
it had no right to act upon such conclusion. We may suppose a
thousand cases in which a testator wquld devise a particular
piece of land to which he at the time had no title. It is sufficient
to suggest the case of an honest mistake as to the ownership, or
of a contemplated purchase. At any rate, he had a right to do
so, and so it has no doubt been done by ten thousand before him
through misapprehension or even caprice. The devise in this
will is of "the west half of the south-west quarter, section 32,
township 35, range 10, containing 80 acres, more or less." Here
then we have the range, the township, the section, the quarter
section, and the half-quarter section set down, and nothing more.
The description is complete and definite, but we find nowhere a
single word of additional description. We find no attempt to
duplicate the description as "my" land, or "in the possession of
A. B.," or "on which is the Big Spring," or "my land on the
Bluff," nor any other single word on which the court may seize
to enable it, with the aid of parol proof, to say that thirty-two
was a false description, and so reject it, and still determine from
the words of the will that section thirty-three was in truth meant.
Strike the word "thirty-two" from this description and the whole
is left entirely unintelligible, for there is nothing else in the will
to supply its place.
I entirely agree with the learned editor, in his definition of the
maxim falga demonstratio non nocet. 'He says, "The ractical
meaning of this maxim is, that however many errors there may
be in the description, either of the legatee or of the subject-matter of the devise, it will not avoid the bequest, PROVIDED enough
remains to show, with reasonable-ertainty, what was intended." I
have emphasized the latter part of this definition because I think
it an important, nay, an indispensable part of it, and which, in its
application to the principal case, was quite overlooked in the note.
If we reject the false description, which is in the number of the
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section, and so leave that a blank, as the editor in fact does, leaving only a specified eighty-acre tract in an unspecified section in
a given township, we have a description which applies alike to no
less than 36 different lots, so far as the description goes, and
nothing "remains in the will to show with reasonable certainty"
which of the 36 tracts was intended. If there be a case in
which the court has rejected one description as false, and substituted another in its place without a single word in any part of the
will, pointing in the most remote degree to the description substituted as the true one, it has not been referred to in the note
appended to the principal case, nor have I met with it elsewhere.
In all the cases there have been two or more descriptibns, so that
when one was rejected, enough was left to enable the court, upon
being informed by parol proof of all of the facts in the view of
the testator when he made the will, to determine with reasonable
certainty what the testator did really intend by the remaining
words when he used them. According to my understanding of
the rule, the meaning of the description must at last be found in
the words which are inserted in the will.
No doubt words may be supplied by implication in reading a
will or an ordinary conveyance, and so it is in reading any composition in any known language. No author ever writes down
all the words which must be understood by the reader to get his
full meaning. When words are thus to be supplied as under
stood, it must always be done from consideration of the context.
Generally such words are omitted intentionally by the author for
the sake of brevity or euphony, but it sometimes occurs from
mistake. In the last case, it is generally more difficult to supply
the omitted words than in the first. So, too, words are sometimes inserted by mistake, when it is the office of construction to
omit them, as it was in the former case to supply the omitted
words. The office of construction is to expound the meaning
which the author intended to convey by the writing, and this must
be done by the consideration of the words written. Whenever
the court can reach the meaning, by omitting a redundant word,
which it is manifest froni the whole text was not designed to be
inserted, or by supplying one clearly to be understood, it will do
so. In doing this, courts apply their own knowledge of affairs
to the composition before them, and declare the meaning accord-
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ing to their convictions. So it was that the court expunged the
redundant word not from the note of hand. Their knowledge of
affairs told them that no honest man ever gave a note intentionally
in which he promised not to pay, &c. In the same way the court,
in Wilbur v. Smith, 5 Allen 194, the case referred to by the
editor, was enabled to declare from the words of the will that the
testator designed to bequeath the residue of his estate. It sometimes happens that the words used in an instrument are incapable
of conveying any definite meaning, and then it is held to be void
for uncertainty.
I agree with the editor in another of his propositions which,
upon its first statement, would seem to be at war with the general
rule, that a patent ambiguity cannot be explained by parol, while
a latent ambiguity, which is made to appear by parol proof, may
be explained by the same class of evidence. He says "that no
case is ever tried where the force, operation, and construction of
a written instrument are concerned, that oral evidence is not
When understood as no
received in aid of its construction."
doubt intended, I say I cordially assent to this proposition,
though I would prefer to substitute the"term extrinsic facts in
place of "oral evidence," for in most cases the courts in ascertaining the meaning of written instruments ask no questions of

others, but apply their own knowledge of things derived from
their own observation; and it is only where such knowledge of
the subject-matter, or of the particular terms, is inadequate to
make clear the meaning of the words which the parties have
used, that resort is had to the knowledge of others better
informed on the particular subject.
The gradations between patent and latent ambiguities are
almost infinite, by which courts have been often perplexed in
applying the general rule already stated, although ordinarily it is
of easy application; but in either case, and in all cases, the
construction must be of the words there found, and it must be
consistent with the words in view of the facts tending to throw
light upon the sense in which they were used. Perhaps no better
case can be found to illustrate the principle I have stated than
that of Fish v. Hubbard, 21 Wend. 651. There Hubbard had
agreed to furnish Fish with water out of the mill-dam sufficient
to run the fulling-mill and carding-machine. To the court here
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was a patent ambiguity, yet no doubt to the parties a definite
meaning was expressed. Parol proof was admitted to show that
Hubbard had a mill-dam on a certain stream, and that Fish had
a fulling-mill and carding-machine just below it. In the light
of these facts, the meaning which the parties intended to express
by the words used was obvious. As I do not know that I could
now express my understanding of the law on this subject any'
better than I did nearly thirty years ago in the case of -Doyle v.
Teag, 4 Scam. 256, I will take the liberty of quoting from the
opinion: "But the true rule, clearly deducible from the cases, I
think, is where the language is of such a character as to show
that the parties had a fixed and definite meaning which they
intended to express, and used language adequate to convey that
idea to persons possessed of all the facts which they had in view
at the time they used the language; it then becomes the duty
of the court to learn those facts, if meed be, by parol proof, and
thus, as far as possible, by occupying the place of the parties
using the expressions, ascertain the sense in which they were
intended to be used. But if the language itself shows that the
parties had no fixed and definite idea which they intended to
convey, then bringing the language in contact with no state of
extraneous facts could enable the words themselves to convey a
clear and definite idea, because, after all, it must be the language
used in view of the circumstances that conveys the meaning of
the parties."
If in this case the word my had been used instead of the in
connection with, or rather in duplication of the description, then
indeed there would have been something in the will to construe,
and by the aid of parol proof the court might ascertain what the
testator meant when he used it-then there would have been an
additional description by which the court might have determined
the subject of the devise, after having eliminated thirty-two. I
repeat, without some sort of additional description in the will,
the court had no right to destroy the description, which is clear,
precise, and single, and insert an additional description of its
own, and then go on and construe it. It is impossible to say
that there is a false description where there is but one description which, as in this, case, is plain and perfect, without an additional reference or word by which the court might be enabled to
determine what land was in the mind of the testator when he
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wrote or dictated the description proposed to be eliminated from
the will. The central idea on which this doctrine of falsa, &c.,
turns is, that there must be two descriptions of some sort, which
facts aliunde, if need be, show are inconsistent with each other,
and enable the court to say satisfactorily which is the true and
which is the false description, when it will discard the false and
give effect to the true, as if the false description had never been
written. As this is the pivot on which this and all similar cases
must turn, at the risk of tautology I must repeat, if no expression
be left in the will which can supply the place of the discarded
part-if the testator had left out what the court is asked to
omit, the devise would have been held void for want of a description of the subject, then the maxim cannot apply. If the learned
editor will search the cases for additional words of description
of the subject of the devise, I think he will always find them
wherever the maxim has been applied. Nothing of the kind is
found in this case.
It is admitted that parol evidence was not admissible to show
that the testator meant one tract of land when he only described
another through mistake, and yet that is the principal case, pure
and simple; and ingeniously turn it as we will, it must come back
to that at last, for the only effect of the parol proof was to show
that the testator wrote section 32 instead of section 83, without
a word of additional description.
Undoubtedly the law does not treat wills and contracts precisely alike. A will is the emanation of one mind, while contracts are the result of negotiations, where conflicting interests
are more likely to scrutinize and adjust the language.
Hence it is, that the courts are more liberal in the construction of wills, in order to effectuate the intention of the testator,
especially in the description of the subject, or the object of a bequest or devise, than they are in construing contracts. But, in
another respect, the law regards a will as of a more sacred character than a contract, in this, that it absolutely forbids the courts
to reform or correct a mistake in a will, no matter how clearly it
may be proved by parol that the testator or the scrivener did
commit a mistake, while it is the every-day practice of the courts
of chancery to reform contracts by substituting one set of words
for another, so as to effectuate the real intent of the parties.
No court has ever ventured thus to change a will. It must ever
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remain in the precise language of the testator, and the only province of the court is to construe that language so as to give effect
to the real intention of the testator by the aid of all the facts
which can enlighten it as to that intent.
Had the court in the principal case done what the editor thinks
it should have done, it would have gone to the utmost limit to
which the Court of Chancery has ever gone in reforming contracts. Indeed, it would have made a new will for the testator,
after destroying the one which he had made and published according to all the forms of the law, and should such tampering with
wills become an accepted doctrine, wills would cease to be what
testators make them, but would become plastic -things in the
hands of the courts, liable to be shaped and moulded to any and
every form under the influence of parol testimony, and made to
read the very reverse of the language employed by the testator.
It will be a disastrous day when the courts shall assume to make
wills for those who no longer remain to protest against the desecration.

We all know of the unscrupulous energy of disappointed expectants in contesting wills, and the courts cannot be too careful
in opening a new door for the admission of perjury, to tamper
with bequests and devises. In this particular case it may be that
a mistake was actually made, and that by reforming the will the
real purposes of the testator would be carried out; but in doing
so a principle would be asserted which would more frequently
defeat than promote the purposes of testators.
The law has its imperfections, as well as all other human institutions, and so long as it attempts to maintain general principles,
necessarily justice must suffer in particular cases.
The legal acumen for which the editor, with whom I feel compelled though reluctantly to disagree, is so justly celebrated, will,
I am satisfied, upon more mature reflection, convince him that
he has for once, at least, fallen into an error; and his well-known
candor, I am sure, must make him anxious, that if such be the
case, it should be pointed out in a courteous and proper way.
I have extended this discussion much beyond the limits designed,
but the importance of the subject magnifies itself the more I reflect upon it, and so I think I will strike out nothing that I have
J. D. CATON.
said.
Ottawa, IlL., April 10th 1871.

